OP-ED | ECOWAS@50: A Unique Opportunity to Live-Up to People’s Aspirations, By Chukwuemeka Eze et.al
Chukwuemeka Eze, Desire Assogbavi and Malick Fall argue that ECOWAS’s golden anniversary presents a unique opportunity for the regional bloc to embody the aspirations of its people and truly represent the diverse communities it serves.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will be 50 years old on May 28, 2025. In its five decades, the regional bloc has navigated the complexities of institutionalizing democratic ethos, integration, and sustainable development.
Reflecting on the myth and realities of its establishment, accomplishments, and challenges has shown that through resilience and unity of purpose among the region’s leaders, ECOWAS has remained an important voice in both African and global affairs. Today, the organization is recognized globally as a revered regional body.
Experts believe the regional grouping has exceeded the expectations of its founding fathers. Despite its challenges, ECOWAS can now be seen as a model of regional integration and co-existence. As a Regional Economic Community (REC), ECOWAS is Africa’s fourth largest economy with a combined GDP of US$633.1 billion, representing about 25.5% of the continent’s total economy and the world’s 21st largest GDP.
ECOWAS’s vision is the creation of a borderless region where the population has access to its abundant resources. The bloc’s population is meant to enjoy free movement, access to efficient education and health systems, and engage in economic and commercial activities while living in dignity in an atmosphere of peace and security.
According to Damtien Tchintchibidja, Vice-President of the ECOWAS Commission, ECOWAS’s major achievements span across access to energy, food security, and human capital development. It seeks to enhance cooperative resilience to violent extremism, counter transnational organized crime, and foster regional stability.
Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas adds that the fundamentals of ECOWAS, as a supranational organization, lie in the strict compliance to its protocols, especially on the free movement of persons and goods as well as its obligation to protocols and instruments relating to democracy and good governance.
While Amb. Abdel-Fatau Musah believes a commitment to multilateralism by RECs such as ECOWAS should be a key driver of mutual economic development in the Member States. He noted that although a regional introspection indicates progress in trade and exports across the ECOWAS bloc since the establishment of the ECOWAS treaty in 1975, a weak obligation to the treaty by Member States has led to a lower impact of tariff agreements and economic growth compared to other RECs on the continent.
This is exemplified by high transaction costs, excessive checkpoints, extortion by customs at the border crossings, and ultimately, severe cross-border smuggling. From all indications, ECOWAS’s investment in tackling complex regional security and political challenges constitutes a diversionary shift to its primary mandate as an economic community.
Fifty years after its establishment, ECOWAS stands as a testament to the power of regional cooperation amid significant challenges and evolving geopolitical landscapes. The organization’s commitment to fostering peace, security, and democratic governance has undeniably laid a robust foundation for economic consolidation.
Moving forward, Member States must reaffirm their obligation to the principles that underpin the ECOWAS vision while addressing the barriers to trade and economic development. By harnessing the potential of its youth population and addressing existing transformative gaps, ECOWAS can achieve its goal of becoming a true economic powerhouse as well as fulfilling its mission of creating a borderless, prosperous, and secure West Africa.
State of Play
A historical reflection of the region since the formation of ECOWAS highlights that though strides have been made in line with the vision of the entity, challenges abound. While these challenges may differ from one member state to another, a broad relationship has been linked to structural and systemic interconnected factors such as poverty, bad governance, corruption, and mismanagement of resources.
Also, the process of state formation and nation-building occasioned by the assemblage of disparate groups under a single unit threatens social cohesion with diverse groups constantly seeking autonomy on grounds of perceived exclusion and marginalization leading to several violent conflicts in the region.
ECOWAS’s vision of a secure and socially cohesive West Africa devoid of conflicts, whose leaders and people place a high premium on peace and collective regional security has subsequently remained a very daunting task due to these challenges and obstacles that continue to affect accelerated development and integration of the region.
These challenges have become transnational, inter-connected, and further complicated by violent extremism/terrorism, and drug, human, and arms trafficking. Other security threats include infectious diseases and pandemics, impacts of climate change, natural disasters, food insecurity, communal and ethnic conflicts, youth unemployment, weak state institutions, election violence, maritime piracy, anti-immigrant sentiments, inter-state tensions, rapid urbanization, demographic changes and irregular migration and geopolitics impacts on ECOWAS integration and development agenda.
Until the recent political crises in Mali, Niger, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) by the military had become unpopular as the region had embraced democracy as the only acceptable political system. The past two decades highlight the dwindling success of democratic structures and systems to yield the desired development for West African citizens in terms of human, social, political, and economic well-being which has shifted populist interests and led to clamor for UCGs.
Electoral management and democracy in West Africa continue to face several challenges such as institutional weaknesses, lack of independence, poor political leadership, and politicization amongst others. Faced with this increasing political threat, ECOWAS as represented by its highest organ of the Authority of Heads of State and Government continues to make far-reaching decisions to respond to democracy, peace, and security challenges in the region.
ECOWAS Member States understand that economic prosperity; cooperation and integration can only be achieved in an environment that is peaceful, stable, and secure. In other words, peace and security are prerequisites for sustainable economic development and human security advancement in the short term, whereas in the long term, human-centered economic development that will eradicate extreme poverty is necessary for durable peace.
During the evolution of the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture, an elaborate structure was laid out to guide and serve as the reference for response efforts to crises and violent conflicts. The structure is the outcome of the operational functions of the 1999 Protocols relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.
Between Myth and Reality
One of the key advances within the ECOWAS region in the last five decades is the increased awareness and commitment to regional integration among its Member States and citizens. Over time, the concept of regional integration has evolved from a primarily governmental agenda to one that is increasingly recognized and supported by a broader segment of society, including civil society organizations, businesses, and the general public. This growing awareness is crucial for achieving ECOWAS’s goals and objectives.
Following the full democratization of ECOWAS Member States in the late 90s, Mali, Guinea, Niger and Burkina Faso have re-ignited the debate on the implications for democracy and citizens’ role in political transitions. It is equally telling that in most of the recent military takeovers, jubilant citizens go out on the streets to welcome the coup plotters suggesting there is more to these changes than research and evidence have revealed.
The apparent rejection of elected officials in preference for the coup plotters seems to indicate a need to redefine and deeply reflect on these changes with an eye on sustainable governance systems that are inclusive, participatory, and transformative. More than any other means of measuring the impact of governance, some of these actions provide a clear picture of why these coups might have taken place in the first place and why coup leaders are perceived as messiahs by sections of society.
To make an already bad situation worse, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS. The withdrawal only became effective on the 29th of January 2025, based on the provisions of Article 91 of the 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty. In July 2024, the three military junta leaders of the AES announced the formation of a “Confederation of Sahel States” under a treaty that seeks greater integration between the three Sahelian states.
The Confederation signifies a step forward in interstate cooperation and a diplomatic initiative that guarantees the independence of the three countries concerning regional or international bodies and aims for collective defense against terrorism, organized crime, armed rebellion, or other threats to the founding states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Since ECOWAS member countries enjoy numerous membership benefits, including economic cooperation through joint production enterprises, common market, liberalized custom policies, free movement of persons, goods, and capital as well as security-related cooperation through the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), exiting the community implies numerous consequences both for the three countries and ECOWAS.
It is therefore more of a myth to imagine that ECOWAS can deal decisively with Member States that contravene the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance through unconstitutional power shifts. Such challenges leave ECOWAS in a legal and political quandary especially when there is a contradiction between national and regional legal frameworks.
ECOWAS has been adjudged inefficient in assisting Member States to address terrorism in the Sahel, despite its efforts to coordinate regional security responses. The response has been hampered by a lack of a unified military force, delays in deploying the planned ESF, and insufficient funding for counterterrorism operations. Additionally, overlapping security initiatives, such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force and international interventions, have created coordination challenges. It has been one of the factors that urged some countries to seek alternative alliances through AES.
The myth is also entertained by the popular perception of ECOWAS being subordinated to or influenced by external factors such as France, the European Union, the African Union as well as international financial institutions. This perception is reinforced by the alignment with Western sanctions instead of stronger solidarity efforts to deal with the root causes of instabilities, and the reliance on Western funding for peacekeeping and antiterrorism efforts.
The principle of consensus in decision-making is often a limitation to progressive policies such as in the case of delaying the ECO currency and the reform for presidential term limit. The need for unanimous agreement often leads to watered-down policies, reluctance to act, and lack of agility.
Another reality of ECOWAS’s 50-year existence is how it reacts to the early warning information from its well-advanced early warning system which collects and analyzes information early enough to determine suitable responses to threats that are identified within member countries. The early warning system was borne out of the experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone where the conflict relapsed after their initial resolution despite the considerable investment in human and financial resources, yet conflicts continue to ravage the region even in situations where it has garnered considerable warning.
Another visible gap is the lack of strong emphasis on peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and development, which relates to efforts to address the root causes of violence and conflicts. ECOWAS has been strong at peacekeeping, but not at peacebuilding although it is currently making some efforts in Guinea Bissau and The Gambia.
The principle of state sovereignty remains a significant obstacle to deeper political integration within ECOWAS. Member States often prioritize their national interests over regional objectives, leading to reluctance to implement ECOWAS protocols and agreements. This is particularly evident in areas such as economic policy harmonization, security cooperation, and the enforcement of democratic norms. The tension between regional commitments and national sovereignty hampers collective action and weakens the organization’s effectiveness.
The proliferation of multiple external actors and regional coalition forces has also overshadowed ECOWAS leadership and ownership in addressing security threats in the region. The situation in Mali and the Sahel region is a typical case in point – UN, EU, AU, France, USA, G5 Sahel, etc. This influence can sometimes exacerbate internal divisions within ECOWAS, as Member States may align with different international partners based on their own political and economic interests.
And so, What?
ECOWAS needs to improve its responses to early warning recommendations as well as national and local stakeholders’ responses to violence triggers in the region. Thus, there is a need to better link early warning to early response. ECOWAS leaders must learn how to navigate the diplomacy of handling military regimes in the sub-region. The recent event which has led to the suspension of three members (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) who are under military rule must be revisited immediately.
The organization must set up a high-powered mediation team to deal with such sensitive matters – if it must continue to be seen as relevant! The hasty and unprofessional diplomatic moves by the organization in this matter have led the three countries to form a parallel organization to the ECOWAS which does not bring unity to the sub-region. The organization must imbibe the spirit of tolerance which it presently lacks.
Further, ECOWAS needs to build strong regional consensus to address the governance challenges relating to unconstitutional power shifts, especially the phenomenon of Third Termism. Term limits should not be a national matter as the consequences of their violation affect the entire region. It may be necessary to revisit the outlawing presidents from remaining in power for longer than two terms which was discussed during the 47th ECOWAS Summit in Ghana and ensure that it conforms with national laws.
Similarly, Political leaders in West Africa should strengthen democratic structures through the enactment of proactive electoral laws that will guarantee free and fair elections in the region. The region’s democratic institutions should be strengthened to withstand democratic shocks as experienced during elections. A typical example is the recent election that produced the current President of Senegal, Bassirou Diomaye Faye.
The ability of ECOWAS leaders to get rid of the sit-tight mentality within its fold will go a long way to preserve democracy and provide the needed economic prosperity to its people. There is equally an urgent need to strengthen the peacebuilding dimension of responses to crises in the region to refocus attention from peacekeeping to addressing the root causes of conflicts and the pervasive threats to human security problems.
A robust regional framework for peacebuilding and human capacity enhancement may be necessary to achieve this. ECOWAS needs to improve its engagements beyond the state-level actors with civil society and community-level actors to increase the involvement of ECOWAS citizens in the community’s conflict prevention, and mitigation activities.
ECOWAS should reimagine and reorganize its partnerships and collaboration with the AU, UN, EU, and other actors at the strategic level and across sectors which is necessary to prevent duplication of efforts, minimize competition and working in silos as well as clinging onto spaces to the detriment of collective efforts to ensure sustained integrated approaches to promoting peace and stability. ECOWAS needs to define a clear responsibility for its partnership with all these actors and ensure that such partnerships are based on mutual trust, respect and comparative advantages.
The ECOWAS integration agenda will inevitably be impacted by the structural changes at the global level and the geopolitics in West Africa. Therefore, it may be necessary for ECOWAS to begin strategizing on how to respond to the rise of ‘developing powers’ that are challenging the influence of Western/former colonial powers which impacts crisis manifestation, preparedness and response in the region. ECOWAS should set up an organ that must deal with insecurity and other forms of threat in the sub-region.
This organ will have the responsibility of coordinating any military action that is needed to safeguard the sub-region. This can come in the form of a collaborative border military force with a mandate to deal with any insurrection within the sub-region. A case study can be derived from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established by the European Union and its allies. The region’s dependence on primary commodities, coupled with the rise of security threats such as terrorism, banditry, and kidnapping has further complicated the economic and political landscape.
On the front of economic integration, ECOWAS should work with its Member States on the concretization of the ECO single regional currency project. The roadmap adopted by Heads of State in 2021 is targeting 2027, with convergence criteria that maintain the deficit within 3% of the GDP, inflation below 10%, and debt-to-GDP ratio not exceeding 70%. This should be a major project for the community in the coming years.
Likewise, ECOWAS must try to reinvigorate its financial resources and institutional capacity. Due to the limited funds and lack of political will, ECOWAS struggled to implement its policies effectively and faced problems in attracting investment and support for regional projects. In addition, the organization lacks the necessary infrastructure and experience to efficiently manage its operations, leading to ineffective coordination and implementation of regional programs. This inefficiency can be greatly improved through sincere collaboration by Member States.
To achieve these goals and truly fulfill its potential as a leading regional bloc, ECOWAS must implement essential reforms that tackle emerging challenges and strengthen its institutional framework. The upcoming 50th anniversary of the organization provides a valuable opportunity to convene an inclusive multistakeholder dialogue— a kind of “West Africa Indaba”—aimed at developing a comprehensive proposal that will elevate the organization to new heights.
In addition, transitioning to a more people-driven ECOWAS and enhancing representation within the ECOWAS Parliament are essential steps toward fulfilling the vision of a prosperous and integrated West African community. By implementing direct elections, ensuring equitable representation, fostering grassroots consultations, strengthening civil society partnerships, and raising public awareness, ECOWAS can enhance its legitimacy and effectiveness in addressing the needs of its citizens.
In Conclusion
In light of the above, there is a need for a policy orientation and overhaul weaving in prior learning and lessons learned in the previous five-decade journey.
Regional integration and the underlying national interests should be based on the substantive implementation of the agreed-upon economic and trade provisions that effectively capture the dimensions of economic development and investments in the region which will in no small measure deescalate the empire of conflicts, democratic backsliding and economic retrogression.
The road ahead will require commitment and collaboration from all Member States with the effective participation of all other segments of our society but the potential rewards are immense, creating a stable, prosperous, and inclusive region for generations to come.
Chukwuemeka Eze is the Director for Just and Inclusive Democratic Futures in Africa, Desire Assogbavi is the Advocacy Adviser at Open Society Foundations while Malick Fall is the Program Manager for Just and Inclusive Democratic Futures in Africa at the Open Society Foundations. The views expressed in this op-ed article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect African Newspage’s editorial policy.
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